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Over 1.9 billion individuals require preventive chemotherapy through mass drug administration (MDA).
Community-directed MDA relies on volunteer community medicine distributors (CMDs) and their
achievement of high coverage and compliance. Yet, it is unknown if village social networks inﬂuence
effective MDA implementation by CMDs. In Mayuge District, Uganda, census-style surveys were con-
ducted for 16,357 individuals from 3,491 households in 17 villages. Praziquantel, albendazole, and
ivermectin were administered for one month in community-directed MDA to treat Schistosoma mansoni,
hookworm, and lymphatic ﬁlariasis. Self-reported treatment outcomes, socioeconomic characteristics,
friendship networks, and health advice networks were collected. We investigated systematically missed
coverage and noncompliance. Coverage was deﬁned as an eligible person being offered at least one drug
by CMDs; compliance included ingesting at least one of the offered drugs. These outcomes were analyzed
as a two-stage process using a Heckman selection model. To further assess if MDA through CMDs was
working as intended, we examined the probability of accurate drug administration of 1) praziquantel, 2)
both albendazole and ivermectin, and 3) all drugs. This analysis was conducted using bivariate Probit
regression. Four indicators from each social network were examined: degree, betweenness centrality,
closeness centrality, and the presence of a direct connection to CMDs. All models accounted for nested
household and village standard errors. CMDs were more likely to offer medicines, and to accurately
administer the drugs as trained by the national control programme, to individuals with high friendship
degree (many connections) and high friendship closeness centrality (households that were only a short
number of steps away from all other households in the network). Though high (88.59%), additional
compliance was associated with directly trusting CMDs for health advice. Effective treatment provision
requires addressing CMD biases towards inﬂuential, well-embedded individuals in friendship networks
and utilizing health advice networks to increase village trust in CMDs.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Background
Over 1.9 billion people in 125 countries require mass drug
administration (MDA) for at least one of seven neglected tropicalmy, University of Cambridge,
r Ltd. This is an open access articlediseases (NTDs) (Webster et al., 2014). NTDs persist in destitute
areas with inadequate sanitation infrastructure and limited access
to clean water. MDA is the distribution of donated preventive
chemotherapies to whole target populations, i.e. both infected and
uninfected individuals in areas predominantly at high risk of hel-
minthic infections. MDA is the mainstay of treatment for these
chronic communicable diseases (Molyneux et al., 2016) because of
the low cost per treatment, success in controlling morbidity, lack of
widely available vaccines, and limited access to formal health careunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
G.F. Chami et al. / Social Science & Medicine 183 (2017) 37e4738in rural poor areas. Soil-transmitted helminths, lymphatic ﬁlariasis,
and schistosomiasis are the most prevalent infections treated
through MDA (World Health Organization, 2015). These infections
caused, respectively, 1.76 million (hookworm), 2.08 million, and
2.61 million disability adjusted life years in 2015 (Global Burden of
Disease Study, 2015 DALYs and HALE Collaborators, 2016).
In our study area of Mayuge District, Uganda, community-
directed MDA is used to treat hookworm, lymphatic ﬁlariasis, and
intestinal schistosomiasis (Schistosoma mansoni) (Chami et al.,
2015, 2016). Each village selects two unpaid community medicine
distributors (CMDs). These volunteers are responsible for moving
door-to-door to deliver medicines to all eligible individuals aged
1þ years (World Health Organization, 2006). CMDs ﬁrst administer
praziquantel for S. mansoni in week one of MDA then revisit all
households in week two of MDA to deliver both albendazole and
ivermectin for hookworm and lymphatic ﬁlariasis. Community-
directed MDA is the only method of delivering preventive chemo-
therapies to both adults and children. Consequently, CMDs play a
pivotal role in large-scale treatment campaigns that aim to curb
transmission and progress towards geographically eliminating in-
fections (Fleming et al., 2016; Molyneux et al., 2016).
Community-directed implementation is the most widely used
MDA approach. It is the cornerstone of the African Programme for
Onchocerciasis Control (APOC) (Homeida et al., 2002) and is rec-
ommended as the principal strategy for lymphatic ﬁlariasis treat-
ment (World Health Organization, 2000). Though, for
schistosomiasis and soil-transmitted helminth control pro-
grammes including in Uganda, MDA is commonly implemented
through primary schools where teachers treat children in atten-
dance (World Health Organization, 2006). Due to over 50%
S. mansoni prevalence in school-aged children, communitywide
treatment for schistosomiasis has been ongoing since 2003 in our
study area (Kabatereine et al., 2004).
Despite their central role in MDA, the behaviors of CMDs are
poorly understood. CMDs are involved in several activities in
addition to MDA, including vitamin distribution, febrile malaria
management, and vaccination campaigns (Katabarwa et al., 2010b).
These time constraints can limit the performance of CMDs (Fleming
et al., 2016; Katabarwa et al., 2010b). CMDs have neglected in-
dividuals for treatment due to the lack of monetary incentives
(Fleming et al., 2016), differences in kinship (Katabarwa et al.,
2010a), or being hard to reach (Parker et al., 2012). However,
these reasons do not explain why individuals who are not provided
treatment from CMDs also are the most socioeconomically disad-
vantaged (Chami et al., 2016; Njomo et al., 2012). There is a need to
assess if CMDs prefer to treat particular individuals and hence, have
an inherent social bias that affects MDA implementation. To do so,
the decision of the CMD to offer medicine (coverage) must be
separated from the choice of the recipient to ingest drugs
(compliance). This separation (Shuford et al., 2016) enables a
needed examination of how CMD performance (coverage) is asso-
ciated with compliance. To our knowledge, no studies have exam-
ined MDA as a two-stage process.
Importantly, to explore potential social biases of CMDs during
MDA implementation, social networks analyses are needed to
reveal how CMDs interact with their community. It is widely
established that the structure of personal interactions in a com-
munity affects the diffusion and adoption of public interventions
(Bond et al., 2012; Borgatti et al., 2009; Centola, 2010; Rogers,
2003). Centrality is a set of heuristics that captures how well con-
nected and embedded a node is in a network (Freeman, 1979). In
social networks, centrality is an indicator of power or inﬂuence
over other nodes (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). For example, high
degree nodes, i.e. with many connections, have been shown to be
effective targets as opinion leaders who facilitate the diffusion/adoption of medical innovations (Valente and Davis, 1999). Though,
targeting centrality for effectively seeding health interventions is
debated (Centola, 2010; Kim et al., 2015; Valente and Davis, 1999).
Other common centrality indicators include betweenness and
closeness. The former indicator measures how often a node lies on
the shortest paths connecting other nodes in a network whereas,
closeness quantiﬁes the shortest path distance from one node of
interest to all other nodes in the network. These path-related
centrality measures have been shown to be more relevant than
formal training of hospital doctors in the Netherlands for the access
to information and the adoption of a new feedback survey (Jippes
et al., 2010). There are few complete network studies on health in
low-income countries, see review in (Perkins et al., 2015). Several of
these analyses focus on how social networks affect the participa-
tion of target populations during medical treatment, e.g. contra-
ceptive use (Gayen and Raeside, 2010), or partaking in preventative
health behaviours, e.g. latrine ownership (Shakya et al., 2015). The
trend of examining demand-side aspects of health extends to
published studies of MDA. The NTD community has focused on
participant take up of MDA and cost-effectiveness of implementa-
tion (Kremer and Miguel, 2007; Krentel et al., 2013; Lo et al., 2015;
Miguel and Kremer, 2004). There is a need to study the supply-side
of MDA, i.e. what determines if and how drugs are offered by CMDs.
Accordingly, though adoption and seeding of health interventions
have been studied, an open question remains. How can social
networks be utilized as an evaluation tool to understand if health
programmes in low-income countries are being implemented as
intended by policymakers?
We demonstrate how social network analyses can be used to
evaluate social biases of CMDs during the implementation of MDA
(Chami et al., 2013). A census-style surveywas conducted for 16,357
individuals in 3,491 households of 17 villages. Friendship and
health advice networks, self-reported treatment outcomes, and
socioeconomic data were collected. We answer the following
question. Is the implementation of MDA through CMDs working as
intended and achieving unbiased communitywide treatment?2. Methods
2.1. Participant sampling
On November 1st 2013donemonth after MDA commencedd17
villages were visited within 5 km of Lake Victoria in Mayuge Dis-
trict, Uganda. Every household was approached and 97.57% (3491/
3578) of all households were surveyed. In total, 87 households were
either unavailable during the survey or refused to participate.
Household heads and/or wives were interviewed. Data was
collected on everyone eligible for MDA in the surveyed households
(16,357 people), i.e. aged 1 þ years.2.2. Social networks
In total, 34 complete village friendship and health networks
were surveyed. Two households were connected within a village if
any person within those homes named or was named in response
to a network prompt. Simple undirected graphs were generated.
Network prompts were established in preliminary community
focus groups. Nominations captured dependencies between
households and thus applied to everyone within a household.
Furthermore, networks were deﬁned at the household instead of
individual level because drug receipt is highly correlated within a
home and CMDs move from home-to-home to deliver medicines
(Chami et al., 2016).
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“Please tell me the clan name ﬁrst then the second name of up to
10 people that are very close friends to you. You should feel
comfortable to turn to this person to borrow tools for ﬁshing or
farming without paying. A close friend is also someone that you see
frequently. Do not name anyone in your household. Provide the
names in the order of who is your closest friend ﬁrst. Only name
people in your village.”
2.2.2. Health trust/advice networks prompt
“Please tell me the clan name ﬁrst then the second name of up to
10 people that you trust for advice about taking drugs or any health
problems. These people do not have to be health workers. Provide
the names in the order of whose opinion you value most and who
you would go to ﬁrst. Only name people in your village.”
2.3. Network indicators
To investigate whether CMDs exhibit social biases during the
implementation of MDA, we examined if and how the offer of
treatment from CMDs varied based on individual centrality, i.e.
network power or status. Individuals occupying central positions in
the network have more inﬂuence over other members of the
community (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). Three common in-
dicators of centrality were examined: degree, betweenness, and
closeness. Degree was measured as the sum of incoming and out-
going edges, ignoring reciprocated edges. The natural log of degree
plus one was used to account for village size and to capture the
impact of large changes in degree, as it is right-skewed (Albert and
Barabasi, 2002). In addition to the association of connectivity and
local inﬂuence (Valente and Davis, 1999), we were interested in
degree as a potential indicator that can be easily monitored byMDA
district health ofﬁcers. In India, degree has been shown to be
recognizable by village members (Banerjee et al., 2014). However,
for social biases to manifest in centrality, it neither needs to be
purposely targeted by CMDs nor directly visible to the community.
Structural individualism theory in analytical sociology reveals that
social networks can affect individual actions precisely because the
network features are not recognizable (Hedstrom, 2005). Accord-
ingly, we examined normalized indicators of betweenness
(Brandes, 2001) and closeness (Freeman, 1979). Betweenness
measures brokerage in a network, i.e. control over information ﬂow
between different sub-groups. Closeness centrality measures
network embeddedness, and the direct access to information from
and inﬂuence over all other nodes in the network. As we are
studying medicine delivery, closeness centrality also may capture
the ease in which individuals can be reached if CMDs follow the
shortest network paths when moving from home to home during
MDA (Borgatti, 2005). Lastly, we included dummy variables rep-
resenting a direct network connection with a CMD.
2.4. Treatment outcomes
To investigate any systematic biases of CMDs and whom the
CMDs chose to approach, treatment outcomes were constructed to
measure if individuals were completely excluded from MDA.
Coverage was deﬁned as the offer of at least one drug of prazi-
quantel, albendazole, or ivermectin to an eligible individual by
CMDs. Compliance was deﬁned as the acceptance and swallowing
of at least one of any medicines offered; hence, compliance was
only observed for individuals offered at least one drug by CMDs. To
assess if MDA through CMDs worked as intended by the national
control programme, two binary indicators of the actual drugs
delivered by CMDs were constructed: an indicator for praziquantel
and another indicator for the delivery of both albendazole andivermectin. Hence, the offer of only one of albendazole or iver-
mectin was classiﬁed as an incorrect pill administration. CMDs
were instructed during their training by vector control ofﬁcers from
the Ugandan Ministry of Health to deliver albendazole and iver-
mectin together in the second week of MDA. Additionally, all CMDs
were trained in directly observed treatment (DOT) (Shuford et al.,
2016), though data was unavailable to conﬁrm if DOT was enforced.
2.5. Socioeconomic variables
Socioeconomic factors included age in years, gender, social status,
occupation, education, religion, afﬁliation with the village majority
tribe (binary), home latrine ownership (binary), home ownership
(binary), and home quality score. Social status (binary) indicated if an
individual previously or currently held a position as a religious, tribe
or clan leaderoron the local village council/government. Religionwas
a dummy variable and positive if the household head of a home was
Muslim; the base category was Christian. Two dummy indicators for
occupation were constructed: ﬁshermen/ﬁshmonger and other
income-earning occupation. Fishermen and ﬁshmongers were high-
lighted as it is debated whether these individuals are less likely to be
offered treatment by CMDs during MDA (Chami et al., 2016; Parker
et al., 2012). The base category for occupations included unem-
ployed (non-income earning) adults, children, housewives, and stu-
dents. Education was the highest level of education completed and
was deﬁned as follows: none (level 0); primary (levels 1e7); senior
1e6 (levels 8e13), diploma (level 14), some university (level 15), and
completed university (level 16). Home quality score was the sum of
the rank of ﬂoor, wall, and roof materials. Material rank order (1e4)
was grass, sticks, plastic, and metal for the roof; mud/cow dung and
sticks, plastic,metal, andbricksor cement for thewalls; andmud/cow
dung, plastic,woodplanks, andbrick or cement for theﬂoor. Zerowas
recorded for a missing material.
2.6. Statistical analysis
Thedatawere analyzed inStatav13.1 (StataCorp) andPythonv2.7.
Locally weighted regression (LOWESS smoothing) (Cleveland, 1979)
was used to determine the functional form of the network variables
against coverage (Supplementary Fig. 1). No clear relationship was
observable between health closeness centrality and coverage, so this
variable was not further investigated. Quadratic forms of friendship
betweenness, friendship closeness, and health degree were used.
These indicators were grand-mean centered to reduce collinearity
and to aid in result interpretation. Marginal linear splines (Gould,
1993) were constructed for friendship degree and health between-
ness centrality at the values of 3.526 and 0.268, respectively. The in-
terval after the knot represents a change in slope of the predictor. To
determine the inclusion of network indicators in the full models,
univariate analyses against coverage (Supplementary Table 1) and
checks of collinearity (Supplementary Table 2) were conducted
(Valenteet al., 2008).Healthdegreewas insigniﬁcant in theunivariate
Probit regression (p-value > 0.05), so was not included in the full
model. Friendship degree and friendship closeness were highly
correlated (Spearmanr0.814,p-value<0.05; SupplementaryTable2)
and therefore analyzed in separate models whilst controlling for
friendship and health betweenness centralities.
To examine systematically missed coverage and individual
noncompliance, we modeled MDA as a two-stage process. An in-
dividual must ﬁrst be offered medicine by CMDs before making a
decision to adopt or reject what is offered. A nonrandom sample of
individuals is offered medicines (Chami et al., 2016), thus adoption
is only observed for a biased sample of the full network.We account
for sample selection biases by studying coverage and compliance in
a Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979) with full maximum
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work accounts for unobserved correlation between errors in the
selection (ﬁrst stage) and outcome (second stage) equations. The
dependent variable of the selection and outcome equations was
coverage and compliance, respectively.
The main predictors for compliance were dummy indicators for
having a direct connection to CMDs in either the health or friendship
networks. In addition to these binary indicators, friendship degree,
friendship closeness centrality, friendship betweenness centrality,
and health betweenness centrality were predictors for coverage.
Socioeconomic covariates were controlled for in both stages of the
regression. Two exclusion criteriadvariables that affect coverage
(selection equation)dwere included: the distance of the village
centre to Lake Victoria and the total homes in each village. These
criteria were selected because lakeside communities have a greater
number of households than villages that do not border Lake Victoria
(Chami et al., 2015). And, the number of households in a village has
been shown to inﬂuence coverage (Fleming et al., 2016). Additional
time is required by CMDs for MDA because, in our study area, there
are only two CMDs per village irrespective of village size. Including
these two village exclusion criteria signiﬁcantly improved our model
(Likelihood ratio tests: Degree-model Chi2 (2) ¼ 409.16, Closeness-
model Chi2 (2) ¼ 405.51; p-values < 0.0001).
For the analysis of treatment offer for speciﬁc drugs, a bivariate
probit model was used to simultaneously estimate two binary
dependent variables and to account for correlation between the
error terms (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). The dependent variables
were 1) praziquantel offer and 2) both albendazole and ivermectin
administration. These outcomes represented the instructionsEl
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n=1019
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1
Figure 1. Treatment outcomes for individuals in 17 study villages. The distribution of p
aged one year and older. During mass drug administration, community medicine distributor
trimester for IVM), or age (under ﬁve years for PZQ). No response was available for individua
for drug distribution. Individuals provided one or more reasons for noncompliance. For th
purpose of the drugs (71.32%, 470/659), did not need to take the drug because they had n
witchcraft caused infections (1.67%, 11/659). Only 27.04% (258/954) of noncompliers deliber
bad side effects (66.28%, 171/258), lack of food or drink to accompany treatment (27.52%, 7
accepting treatment (3.49%, 9/258), and clan and tribe differences with the drug distribut
because of both the lack of health education and reasons of deliberate refusal.provided to CMDs during training by the national control pro-
gramme concerning how and in what order pills should be
administered. Network indicators and covariates were speciﬁed as
described for the Heckman selection model. As we were interested
in MDA implementation with CMDs, we focused on the speciﬁc
drugs offered for coverage as opposed to the decision of an indi-
vidual to refuse a particular treatment.
In all regressions, we account for interdependencies between
individuals and between households. Individuals (14,431) were
nested in 3,387 households and 17 villages. These individuals
included people who were eligible for at least one treatment and
did not havemissing information for any of themain predictors and
covariates (Supplementary Tables 3-4). Standard errors were nes-
ted and clustered at both the household and village levels, with
households as the primary sampling unit and villages as the strata
(Judkins, 1990; Williams, 2000). A small sample correction was
performed for the few clusters at the village level, as described in
(Bester et al., 2011). We used clustered standard errors instead of
random intercept models, since selection may manifest differently
at each level, the balance of hierarchical data changes due to se-
lection, and errors may not be equally correlated by level.
3. Results
3.1. Correlation of village coverage and compliance
Fig. 1 presents a census of treatment outcomes for the popula-
tion in the 17 study villages; household level outcomes are pro-
vided in Supplementary Figure 2. During one month of MDA, onlyIndividuals
aged 1+ years
N=16357
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(Ineligible n=815
No response n=788)
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ls where treatment offer was unknown. Stage 1 and 2 represent the sequence of actions
e lack of health education, individuals stated that they did not know the beneﬁt and
o symptoms (25.95%, 171/659), believed the drugs did not work (2.12%, 14/659), and
ately refused treatment, despite knowledge of the drug beneﬁts. Their responses noted
1/258), repurposing treatment for livestock (3.49%, 9/258), few friends and neighbors
or (1.50%, 4/258). Only 3.88% (37/954) of individuals did not comply with treatment
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Figure 2. Association of coverage and compliance across 17 villages. The proportion
of eligible individuals offered treatment (coverage) within each village was positively
correlated to the proportion of those individuals who ultimately accepted and swal-
lowed treatment (compliance). The ﬁt of an ordinary least squares regression (Coeff.
0.408, p-value ¼ <0.001; 95% CI 0.293, 0.523) is overlaid with the raw data points. The
range of village coverage and compliance was 10.9%e86.6% and 67.8%e99.1%,
respectively.
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offered at least one treatment. Amongst the people approached,
88.59% (7405/8359) accepted and swallowed the offered treatment.
The majority of noncompliance (69.08%, 659/954) was due to
inadequate health education, including misinformation, about the
distributed drugs. As shown in Fig. 2, village-level treatment
coverage (% of all eligible people) and compliance (% of eligible
people offered drugs) were positively and strongly correlated
(Spearman r 0.691, p-value¼ 0.002). Socioeconomic characteristics
of participants by treatment outcomes are provided in
Supplementary Tables 3-5.3.2. Network determinants of coverage
Tables 1e2 present the determinants of treatment from the
Heckman selection model. The number of friendship edges was
positively associated with the probability of being offered at least
one drug by CMDs (p-value < 0.001). Additional friendship con-
nections beyond 33 edges (97th percentile) did not signiﬁcantly
increase the probability of coverage when compared to the prob-
ability of coverage for individuals with friendship degree of 33 (p-
value > 0.05). An individual needed to have high friendship degree
in order to have a higher likelihood of being offered treatment; it
was not sufﬁcient simply to be connected to other individuals with
high friendship degree. Average neighbor friendship degree was
uncorrelated with coverage (Obs. 14431, Spearman r 0.008, p-
value ¼ 0.340). The distance (geodesic paths) from one MDA
recipient to all other individuals in the network was associated
with the likelihood of treatment offer from CMDs. Friendship
closeness centrality was positively correlated with coverage (p-
value < 0.001). Concerning direct network connections, CMDs were
7e7.2% more likely to deliver drugs to individuals who trusted
CMDs for health advice (p-value < 0.001). Though, being close
friends with CMDs did not affect the likelihood of being approached
and offered medicines by CMDs (p-value > 0.05).
Fig. 3 shows the predicted probabilities of treatment offer at the
range of values of friendship degree and friendship closeness. The
individuals most likely to receive a treatment offer were in themost
well-connected and well-embedded households of friendship
networks. The probability of coverage was 0.658 for friendshipdegree  33 and a 0.897 for closeness centrality that was 0.257
greater than the mean.
When directed network indicators, which revealed who named
whom, were used to predict coverage, all results were upheld
(Supplementary Tables 6-7). Reexamining friendship degree in two
partsdincoming versus outgoing edgesdrevealed that the likeli-
hood of being offered medicines from CMDs was positively related
to both the popularity (in-degree) and activity (out-degree) of the
recipient's household. Concerning who trusted whom for health
advice, individuals who named CMDs were more likely to be
offered drugs during MDA when compared to individuals who did
not name CMDs. In contrast, the individuals named by CMDs, i.e.
people the CMDs go to for health advice, were not more likely to be
offered medicines during MDA.
3.3. Accuracy of drug delivery by CMDs
Fig. 4 presents the effects of friendship degree and closeness on
the probability of being offered particular combinations of pills
from CMDs (Supplementary Tables 8-9). The probability of being
offered praziquantel, both albendazole and ivermectin, or all three
MDA drugs was positively associated with friendship degree and
closeness. Remarkably, the accuracy of medicine administration
also positively varied with friendship degree and closeness
amongst only the individuals who were offered at least one drug
(Supplementary Tables 10-11).
3.4. Overlap of friendship centrality and social status
In focus groups (Supplementary Data), CMDs indicated they
became drug distributors to gain preferential health treatment at
government health centers and social status within their village.
Individuals with formal social status, i.e. village government
members and religious, tribe or clan leaders, had a 0.07 higher
probability (p-value < 0.05) of positive coverage than individuals
with no such social status (Tables 1e2). However, unlike friendship
degree and closeness, formal social status was not associated (p-
value > 0.05) with being administered the correct combination of
pills by CMDs (Supplementary Tables 8-11). Therewas an overlap of
network status (high friendship degree or high friendship close-
ness) and formal social status (Supplementary Table 12). In-
dividuals with social status had higher friendship degree and
closeness when compared to individuals with no such status. This
contrast was more pronounced when friendship degree and
closeness were compared by household social status, which was
deﬁned as at least one eligible person of social status in the home.
Interestingly, friendship degree, like formal social status, was a
personal attribute that was recognizable by CMDs and the wider
community (Supplementary Data).
3.5. Trust in CMDs and compliance
CMDs were amongst the most trusted individuals for informa-
tion about drugs and other health problems (Fig. 5), though CMDs
were not necessarily the most connected individuals in their village
health advice network. Overall, 38.96% (5748/14754) of all in-
dividuals eligible for MDA belonged to a household that named the
CMD as someone trusted for health advice. After CMDs, the types of
people most trusted for health advice, in order, included
geographical neighbors, close friends, and village government
members (Supplementary Table 13).
For anyone offered treatment, the average estimated probability
of complying with treatment was high (0.878, p-value < 0.001);
trusting CMDs for health advice was associated with an additional
0.048 (p-value ¼ 0.001) probability of compliance (Tables 1e2). In
Table 1
Average marginal effects (AME) of coverage and compliance for friendship degree Heckman model.
A) First stage dependent variable: coverage B) Second stage dependent variable: compliance
Predictors AME Clustered Std. Err. p-value 95% CI AME j Coverage¼1a Clustered Std. Err. p-value 95% CI
LN(Friendship degree þ1), [0, 3.526] 0.067 0.016 <0.001 0.036 0.099
LN(Friendship degree þ1), [>3.526] 0.303 0.232 0.193 0.153 0.758
Friendship betweenness centralityb 1.513 1.073 0.158 3.616 0.590
Health betweenness centrality [0, 0.268] 0.420 0.350 0.231 0.267 1.107
Health betweenness centrality [>0.268] 0.520 0.769 0.499 0.988 2.028
Close friends with CMD 0.004 0.020 0.846 0.042 0.035 0.021 0.017 0.224 0.013 0.054
Trusts CMD for health advice 0.072 0.016 <0.001 0.040 0.104 0.048 0.015 0.001 0.019 0.077
Age in years 0.001 <0.001 0.003 <0.001 0.002 <0.001 <0.001 0.546 <-0.001 0.001
Female 0.011 0.008 0.179 0.005 0.027 0.011 0.008 0.143 0.004 0.026
Social status: was or is a religious, tribe, or clan leader or on the local village council 0.074 0.026 0.005 0.022 0.125 0.018 0.025 0.476 0.031 0.066
Fisherman or ﬁshmonger 0.018 0.019 0.338 0.055 0.019 0.002 0.016 0.907 0.034 0.030
Other income-earning occupation 0.019 0.013 0.159 0.007 0.045 0.027 0.013 0.029 0.003 0.052
Highest level of education attained 0.009 0.002 <0.001 0.012 0.006 0.006 0.002 <0.001 0.009 0.003
Muslim household head 0.049 0.017 0.005 0.082 0.015 0.021 0.015 0.149 0.050 0.008
Household head belongs to village majority tribe 0.029 0.016 0.069 0.002 0.060 0.038 0.014 0.008 0.010 0.066
No home latrine 0.081 0.028 0.004 0.136 0.026 0.001 0.024 0.974 0.047 0.049
Home owned, not rented 0.008 0.024 0.737 0.039 0.055 0.002 0.023 0.934 0.043 0.047
Home quality score 0.001 0.002 0.559 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.709 0.005 0.004
Village centre greater than 0.50 km from Lake Victoria 0.160 0.017 <0.001 0.193 0.127
Total homes in village 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 0.001
Obs. 14431
Households 3387
Inverse hyperbolic tangent of r 1.348 0.241 <0.001 1.821 0.875
r 0.874 0.057 0.949 0.704
Wald test of independent equations, Chi2 31.100 <0.001
a Average marginal probability of compliance ¼ 1 conditional on coverage (being offered treatment).
b Entered in the Heckman selection model as grand-mean centered and a quadratic, i.e. also including the squared form.
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Table 2
Average marginal effects (AME) of coverage and compliance for friendship closeness Heckman model.
A) First stage dependent variable: coverage B) Second stage dependent variable: compliance
Predictors AME Clustered Std. Err. p-value 95% CI AME j Coverage¼1a Clustered Std. Err. p-value 95% CI
Friendship closeness centralityb 1.098 0.165 <0.001 0.775 1.421
Friendship betweenness centralityb 1.328 0.957 0.165 3.205 0.548
Health betweenness centrality [0, 0.268] 0.286 0.345 0.407 0.390 0.963
Health betweenness centrality [>0.268] 0.676 0.768 0.379 0.831 2.182
Close friends with CMD 0.028 0.020 0.161 0.068 0.011 0.016 0.017 0.362 0.018 0.049
Trusts CMD for health advice 0.070 0.016 <0.001 0.038 0.102 0.048 0.015 0.001 0.019 0.077
Age in years 0.001 <0.001 0.003 <0.001 0.002 <0.001 <0.001 0.540 <-0.001 0.001
Female 0.010 0.008 0.197 0.005 0.026 0.011 0.008 0.148 0.004 0.026
Social status: was or is a religious, tribe, or clan leader or on the local village council 0.070 0.026 0.007 0.019 0.122 0.018 0.025 0.481 0.031 0.067
Fisherman or ﬁshmonger 0.015 0.019 0.436 0.051 0.022 0.001 0.016 0.929 0.033 0.030
Other income-earning occupation 0.017 0.013 0.203 0.009 0.043 0.027 0.013 0.030 0.003 0.052
Highest level of education attained 0.009 0.002 <0.001 0.012 0.006 0.006 0.002 <0.001 0.009 0.003
Muslim household head 0.043 0.017 0.011 0.077 0.010 0.020 0.015 0.171 0.049 0.009
Household head belongs to village majority tribe 0.029 0.016 0.064 0.002 0.060 0.039 0.014 0.007 0.011 0.067
No home latrine 0.079 0.028 0.005 0.133 0.024 0.001 0.025 0.961 0.047 0.049
Home owned, not rented 0.013 0.024 0.579 0.033 0.060 0.003 0.023 0.897 0.042 0.048
Home quality score 0.002 0.002 0.444 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.723 0.005 0.004
Village centre greater than 0.50 km from Lake Victoria 0.170 0.017 <0.001 0.203 0.138
Total homes in village 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 <-0.001
Obs. 14431
Households 3387
Inverse hyperbolic tangent of r 1.406 0.353 <0.001 2.098 0.714
r 0.887 0.076 0.970 0.613
Wald test of independent equations, Chi2 15.84 <0.001
a Average marginal probability of compliance ¼ 1 conditional on coverage (being offered treatment).
b Entered in the Heckman selection model as grand-mean centered and a quadratic, i.e. also including the squared form.
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Figure 3. Predicted probabilities of coverage at values of friendship degree and friendship closeness. Predicted probabilities of coverage (the offer of at least one drug) against
A) friendship degree and B) friendship closeness centrality are shown from the results of the Heckman selection models of Tables 1-2.
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Figure 4. Predicted probabilities of the accuracy of medicine delivery by CMDs at values of friendship degree and friendship closeness. Panels AeC show the predicted
probabilities from the bivariate probit model that includes friendship degree (Supplementary Table 8). Panels DeF present the predicted probabilities from the bivariate probit
model with friendship closeness (Supplementary Table 9). Panels C and F from each model show the probabilities for both binary outcomes, 1) praziquantel and 2) both albendazole
and ivermectin, equaling one.
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Figure 5. Community medicine distributors and health advice networks. Nodes represent households and edges represent trust for health advice. The largest component of each
network is presented. Each ID represents one village. Two community medicine distributors (CMDs) are shown in red. The networks were drawnwith a force-directed layout, so the
most connected and embedded nodes were placed in the centre of the graph. IDs 1e3, 12, and 16 show two CMDs with similar network location.
G.F. Chami et al. / Social Science & Medicine 183 (2017) 37e47 45the analysis of directed network connections, compliance only was
positively associated (p-value < 0.05) with an individual naming a
CMD as someone trusted for medical advice (Supplementary
Tables 6-7). Individuals whom CMDs turned to for health advice
were not more likely (p-value > 0.05) to ingest medicines when
offered treatment by CMDs (Supplementary Tables 6-7). Being
close friends with CMDs was weakly correlated with trusting CMDs
for health advice (Obs. 14431, Spearman r 0.214, p-value < 0.001).
However, having a connection to CMDs in the friendship network
did not increase compliance (p-value > 0.05). Lastly, formal social
status (Tables 1e2) was not related to compliance.4. Discussion
Social biases of CMDs preventedMDA fromworking as intended
by the national control programme. CMDs offered treatment to
people with powerful network positions. Individuals with high
friendship degree and high friendship closeness centrality were
most likely to be offered not only at least one drug during MDA, butalso to be administered the correct combination of pills. Moreover,
social inequalities in treatment, e.g. variation in socioeconomic
status, manifested in the CMDs' decisions to distribute treatment
and not in the individual's decision to accept the drugs offered. The
treatment of individuals with high centrality aided CMDs in gaining
social status. Accordingly, exploiting the social biases of CMDs
could improve MDA implementation. Volunteer CMDs, who incur
high opportunity costs (Fleming et al., 2016; Katabarwa et al.,
2010b), can be incentivized without monetary payments.
Providing recognition to CMDs for treating disadvantaged groups
from individuals with more social resources, i.e. village inﬂuence,
can assist CMDs in constructing upward social ties in the village
network for attaining or retaining their personal status whilst
achieving objectives of MDA (Lin et al., 1981).
Though distributing drugs implies providing a (local) public
good, our ﬁndings showed that CMDswere not primarily motivated
by a desire for prosocial behavior or altruism (Ariely et al., 2009;
Benabou and Tirole, 2006). If CMDs were behaving prosocially, i.e.
trying to appear fair and benevolent to most community members,
G.F. Chami et al. / Social Science & Medicine 183 (2017) 37e4746so as to create a positive image that boosts CMD social status, then
they would have treated the most socioeconomically disadvan-
taged households. Similarly, CMDs did not strive for MDA efﬁciency
during drug distribution, as they would have targeted less privi-
leged individuals who are suspected to harbour the heaviest
infection intensities.
Approaching inﬂuential individuals provided CMDs with the
visibility, status, and social acceptability that otherwise would be
received from treating the wider community. Instead of
approaching all eligible individuals, CMDs treated the well-
connected or well-embedded people in the community. These
treated individuals directly observed the CMDs conducting MDA. In
turn, CMDs appeared benevolent to powerful members of the
community, i.e. individuals with inﬂuential network positions.
These inﬂuential individuals might then transfer their perception of
CMD benevolence, importance, and rank to other village members.
If this diffusion was occurring, CMDs were efﬁcient self-promoters
who directly or unintentionally targeted the individuals who had
the most connections (friendship degree) and best access (friend-
ship closeness) to other community members (Rogers, 2003).
Additionally, inﬂuential individuals, when interacting with CMDs,
could also be perceived by the community to be associated with
CMDs and in turn confer status to CMDs (Kilduff and Krackhardt,
1994). Notably, beyond the image of the CMD, there was no evi-
dence that people with high friendship degree and closeness, were
spreading actual information about MDA since untreated in-
dividuals often do not know that drugs are available (Chami et al.,
2016). As the number of people with high network or social sta-
tus is limited, future work should explore how CMDs choose whom
to treat amongst the people without status. Though nonlinear, the
positive association of friendship closeness with coverage may
suggest that CMDs ﬁrst approach individuals based on status then
put minimal effort to ﬁnd other individuals in the social network,
i.e. by following the shortest network paths.
The pursuit of status and recognition from peersdespecially
powerful individualsdis consistent with the hypothesis that CMDs
distribute pills because it is in their self-interests. Accordingly, we
anticipate that our ﬁndings will extend to other community-
directed MDA programmes either elsewhere in Uganda, in other
sub-Saharan countries, or for different infections such as oncho-
cerciasis, lymphatic ﬁlariasis, and trachoma. Moreover, any public
intervention through CMDs, such as bed net distribution, might be
affected by CMD social biases. Issues to consider for other contexts
include the impact of payment on CMD motivations (beyond
training remuneration), the frequency of CMD turnover if CMDs
cannot retain their position long enough to gain village status, and
ensuring that close friendship is deﬁned in locally relevant terms.
Ideally, social biases would not be applicable for school-basedMDA.
However, this conjecture depends on school-based MDA working
as intended, i.e. schoolteachers simply treating all children in
attendance. There is a need to examine if primary school teachers,
who also volunteer in MDA, directly or unintentionally provide
discriminatory treatment.
Across villages, the level of compliancemay have been related to
the level of coverage due to observed and unobserved factors. Trust
in CMDs was associated with both coverage and compliance and
might be a directly targetable aspect of CMD behavior for increasing
treatment. Unobserved factors may include treatment spillover
effects where individuals are more likely to comply with treatment
when a greater proportion of their community is offered treatment.
Here we focused on systematic noncompliance and programme
implementation. However, future studies concerned with individ-
ual take-up of MDAwill want to consider exactly which drugs were
refused when offered.
Two strategies could be employed alongside routine trainingand MDA implementation. First, national programs should instruct
individuals responsible for training and overseeing CMDs to
monitor the treatment of households that do not havemany friends
in the village. Such monitoring is possible as we showed that both
CMDs and the general population widely and easily recognized
high friendship degree (Supplementary Data). Second, make all
treatment offers public events. Currently, drugs are distributed in
private; most individuals who are not offered treatment do not
know that any drugs are available in the village (Chami et al., 2016).
Public charts could be used in each village to record the households
offered treatment. This method of increasing the visibility of drug
distribution may redirect CMDs to act in a more prosocial manner
in order to gain social status (Ariely et al., 2009; Benabou and Tirole,
2006) and, importantly, improve treatment coverage.
Though the lack of health education has been described else-
where as a major reason for noncompliance in MDA (Krentel et al.,
2013), we also found a deeper issue at stake. Most individuals did
not trust CMDs for health advice. CMDs were responsible for con-
ducting health education about MDA in their village. If only the
reason for noncompliance were examined without the analysis of
health networks, an intervention to increase the number or in-
tensity of health campaigns would be advocated. However, such an
intervention alone is insufﬁcient if noncompliers and the majority
of villagers do not trust CMDs. Future health education campaigns
should involve respected members of the community, such as local
council members or popular individuals with many friends to build
trust for health advice between CMDs and the recipients of MDA.
Local council members and well-connected individuals already
were more likely to be offered treatment by CMDs, so what is
needed is for these individuals to convince their contacts to trust
CMDs for health advice. Future work may investigate the use of
communitywide nominations of who is most trusted for health
advice. This information could be used to ﬁnd individuals to include
in sensitization campaigns. National control programmes also may
provide CMDs with the list of individuals who are widely trusted
for health advice. CMDs could be encouraged to treat these in-
dividuals since they were not more likely to be offered medicines
when compared to people who were not widely trusted for health
advice. Utilizing social networks to motivate CMDs and ensure they
know the importance of treating the wider community could in-
crease coverage of, and compliance with, mass treatment in
developing countries.
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